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Is it still an ally? Has he become an opponent too? That Europeans are asking themselves these questions indicates how radically Donald Trump and his new administration have rewritten the terms of the transatlantic security relationship. Trump has refused to rule out the use of force to take control of Greenland, Ally Denmark’s sovereign territory. In her rush to reach an agreement with Russia to end her fight against Ukraine, the Trump team has made early concessions to Moscow while cutting the capitals of Kyiv and European talks. US officials claim to want a righteous and sustainable peace in Ukraine, but at the same time, they are preaching the country’s mineral wealth as payments for previous US military aid.
It was always clear, the US would force the Europeans to take on the burden of their security. The question was whether the change would agree and regular or whether it would be chaotic and dangerous. Europe lost the moment to prepare for the first and is now faced with the latter.
After the full -scale occupation of Russia in Ukraine three years ago, Europeans collectively failed to reassess the speed and extent that Russia’s unproven aggression required, despite the efforts of Poland and other first lines and some innovations of EU protection. Trump’s return to power and the antagonism of his administration have destroyed Europe’s complacency.
An emergency meeting of European leaders in Paris on Monday was an initial chance to show renewable determination and ambition to rebuild the protection of the continent and ensure that any peace agreement in Ukraine is fair and sustainable. But it was strangely inconsistent. British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer boldly said he was ready to send troops to Ukraine to guarantee the rifle if the US provided reserve. Other leaders found the question very difficult. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz boldly said he was “frustrated” the case had come out at all.
Europe must still act in its long -term interests, even if it would fight to defend itself today without American support. Its future security will be placed in Ukraine, so its first task is to increase military aid to KyIw by funding Ukrainian weapons production, pouring resources in drone and anti-land technology, subsidizing the expanded capacity of production and signature of long-term contracts to replace the USA- Kit supplied such as air protection and long-range shocks. Can use his regime of sanctions to enter and influence negotiations.
European powers must design military plans to prevent Russia from attacking Ukraine again after a ceasefire, ranging from the best training of Ukrainian troops to the implementation of a flying area to potentially send troops as a “security force”. Putting boots on the ground in sufficient quantities would be a great effort. It can be impossible without US support. But Europeans cannot prevent Russia by standing aside.
Finally, Europeans need to invest. Defense viewing mainly requires steady increase in national defense spending, with countries reviewing their fiscal frameworks and the advantages of spending to make room. There is a strong case for joint borrowing, whether at the EU level or as a coalition of will including the United Kingdom, to fund an increase in short-term spending and to finance joint procurement. A multilateral defense bank can also help governments and defense producers. Europe will also have to build independent planning and command structures, ideally within NATO, but potentially outside it.
It is not impossible for these steps to be able to persuade Trump to abide by a redefined alliance and maintain a final guarantee of American security for Europe. What is certain is that without such an adjustment, Europe will be exposed dangerously.
