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The writer is a contributing editor of the FT
There are at least three different political currents running through the European parties labeled “hard” or “extreme right”. The more these develop – some as conservatives who appeal to largely working- and lower-middle-class audiences, some as radicals with overtly authoritarian leanings – the less they will resemble each other. At the moment, they are lumped together, extremely negatively, under these rubrics in media and political debate. But because of the sharp differences between them, they are better labeled as the “new right”.
They have in common the opposition to an EU still committed to increasing its powers and therefore reducing them. They no longer commit to leaving the union, but insist that their governments will be fully sovereign.
They are strongly opposed to mass immigration: this remains largely the most attractive policy for the general public. Most European states have adopted tougher rules, some of which – as in Sweden and Finland – have been created and administered by parties of the new right or in coalition with or providing parliamentary support to the centre-right.
However, these common attitudes change in practice. Since 2022, Giorgia Meloni, the young right-wing politician serving as Italy’s prime minister, has worked closely at times with European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen. Meloni also supports Ukraine’s self-defense war against Russia and places himself firmly in the pro-NATO camp – as do the Sweden Democrats.
Marine Le Pen, the leading figure in France’s Rassemblement National, once had pro-Russian leanings, and her party accepted a loan from a (now defunct) Russian-controlled bank. However, in a speech to the French assembly in March, she said that President Vladimir Putin had “triggered a war on the EU’s doorstep and a geopolitical crisis that is without a doubt the most dramatic of the last 20 years. . . It is the heroic resistance of the Ukrainian people that will lead to the defeat of Russia. This appeared to be a sharp turn of policy. The RN is now France’s most popular party and Le Pen, its likely candidate in the 2027 presidential election (although she faces a legal case that could bar her from running), would currently win.
Russia is an important player in the rise of the New Right. Many of these parties, taking their cue from Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, remain closer to Russia than to a US-dominated West. They tend to be based in former communist Central Europe – but perhaps the most important of these is the Alternative for Germany, the main German party of the new right. Similar Russophile sympathies are displayed by the smaller Alliance Sahra Wagenknecht, whose leader combines left-wing economics with a commitment to reduce the number of immigrants, current and future. She argues that the German working class is losing out in the race for housing, medical care and social services.
From this still changing scene, the main currents include the new right parties of Italy, France and Sweden, which claim to be fully democratic and part of the Western camp; and a larger but so far less successful group, many in Central Europe, who are at least rhetorically more militantly anti-EU, more stridently anti-immigrant and more deeply attached to the values of Christianity, family and tradition .
Among them are a number of parties that cut across both currents, and include Hungary’s Fidesz, Spain’s Vox, Portugal’s Chega and most importantly the AfD. Thuringian AfD leader Björn Höcke tends to play with Nazi themes, shouting at meetings: “All for Germany!”, a Nazi stormtrooper slogan banned in Germany (he has been fined twice for this). The co-leaders, Tino Chrupalla and Alice Weidel, are considered moderates by comparison and seek to unify the party. Chrupalla has repeatedly pleaded with members to unite and “stop thinking in camps” – although he has been prominent in the pro-Russian camp.
The right “far” or “difficult” can be reasonably used by Höcke and the thousands of people who follow him. Policies developed by some other parties would also qualify. It is inappropriate when used by those who profess democratic bonafides and live up to them: the label impedes understanding of the sources and reasons for their anti-establishment stances. Of course, it is possible that they are engaged in a long game of protesting moderation while preparing for authoritarianism when in power. The influence and political positioning of Donald Trump, who has regarded all these parties as co-belligerents, will be decisive in this – as well as their ability to govern. But so far, so anti-totalitarian.
