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There is a reason why birth rates are an increasingly prominent feature in discourse and policy making today. Population aging and decline is one of the world’s most powerful forces, shaping everything from the economy to politics and the environment.
But one weakness of the debate—perhaps even the term “birth rate” itself—is that it implies the goal is the same today as it was in the past: finding ways to encourage couples to have more children. A closer look at the data suggests an entirely new challenge.
Take the US as an example. Between 1960 and 1980, the average number of children born to a woman halved from almost four to two, even though the proportion of women in married couples was much lower. There were still many couples in happy, stable relationships. They had simply chosen to have smaller families.
But in recent years, most of the decline comes not from decisions made by couples, but from a marked decline in the number of couples. If US marriage and cohabitation rates had remained constant over the past decade, America’s total fertility rate would be higher today than it was then.
The central demographic story of modern times is not just the decline in the birth rate, but the rise in the rate of celibacy: a much more fundamental change in the nature of modern societies.
Relationships are not only becoming less common, but increasingly fragile. In egalitarian Finland, it is now more common for cohabiting couples to separate than to have a child, a sharp reversal of the historical norm.
When presented as an increase in happy childless Dinks (dual income, childless couples) with lots of disposable income, the social trends accompanying declining birth rates look good.
But the rise in singleness and relationship dissolution is a less rosy story, especially given that the decline in relationship formation is steepest among the poorest. Of course, many people are happily single. The freedom to choose how to spend one’s life and with whom (or without) should be celebrated. But broader data on loneliness and dating frustrations suggest that all is not well.
The trend is global. From the US, Finland and South Korea to Turkey, Tunisia and Thailand, declining birth rates are increasingly coming in the wake of a recession in youth relationships. Baby bonuses put the cart before the horse when a growing proportion of people are single. Even in parts of sub-Saharan Africa, similar trends may be underway.
Why an almost worldwide decline, and why now? That this is happening almost everywhere at the same time points more to broad changes operating across borders than country-specific factors.
The proliferation of smartphones and social media has been one such exogenous shock. Geographic differences in the rise of singles broadly follow mobile Internet use, especially among women, whose calculus in weighing potential partners is changing. This is consistent with research showing that social media facilitates the spread of liberal values (particularly among women only) and increases women’s empowerment.
The decline in mating is deepest in highly online Europe, East Asia and Latin America, followed by the Middle East and then Africa. Singleness remains rare in South Asia, where women’s access to the Web is more limited.
This is not to overstate the role of social media. Other cultural differences between countries and regions mediate both the spread of liberal ideals and people’s ability to act on them. Caste and honor systems encourage high rates of intermarriage, regardless of access to media, and female education, income, and employment vary significantly between regions.
But while the specific mechanisms are up for debate, the prevalence of celibacy and its role in lowering birth rates shows that while financial incentives and other policy changes may push birth rates higher, they are working against much larger forces. sociocultural strengths.
Policies aimed at facilitating the formation of relationships may be more effective than those aimed at helping couples have children.
A world of growing singleness is not necessarily better or worse than one filled with couples and families, but it is fundamentally different from what has gone before, with huge social, economic and political implications. We are faced with a conundrum: is this what people really want? If not, what needs to change?
john.burn-murdoch@ft.com, @jburnmurdoch
Data sources and methodology
Data sources: Cohabitation rates worldwide were calculated using data from socio-economic household surveys obtained through the International Labor Organization’s Arab Barometer, Demographic and Health Surveys program and directly from national statistical agencies.
Methods: Change in the US total fertility rate was decomposed using a counterfactual analysis holding constant marital status rates (with separate categories for married and cohabiting couples) and age-specific fertility rates within each relationship status. This distinguishes the role of declining rates of relationship formation from declining rates of childbearing within relationships.